1975), and psychology (Berkowitz & Waister, 1976; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) .
Although management applications abound (e.g., equity theory and industrial relations negotiation), they do not directly address the normative expectations governing employer-employee exchanges. The most relevant organizational the ories are Schein's (1965) "psychological contract" and Simon's (1947) "in ducements/contributions contract." Our argument is the result of a thorough examination of the exchange relationship they identified. We suggest that four distinct types of normative expectations govern these exchanges. Work that is di rectly concerned with norm differences in exchange, the social psychologists' de bate on which norm best characterizes intimate relationships, and Williamson's (1975) discussion of the different norms governing marketplace and firm trans actions are applied to employer-employee exchanges. We then analyze why these exchanges can be characterized by four contradictory types of normative expec tations, and we conclude with the implications of these norm differences for man agement research in organizational climate, socialization, and compensation.
The four distinct normative expectations are described below and summarized in Table 1 . 1. Profit maximization: This norm holds that each party's objective in the ex change is to maximize the value of its own outcomes relative to its own inputs. The other parties' outcomes and inputs are not relevant; attention is to one's own gain only. That is, 0/l s is maximized without regard to 0 0 and l 0 , where 0, and l s are one's own perceived outcome and perceived input, and 0 0 and 1 0 are cor responding quantities for the other. This norm is assumed to characterize mar ketplace transactions (Williamson, 1975) ; for example, shoppers are assumed to most often buy their goods where they can get the best combination of price, quality, and convenience and to be unconcerned with the profit margin of the al ternative sellers. The norm of profit maximization suggests that parties will be primarily motivated to go where they can get the best deal and will not be con cerned about the seller's prosperity unless that has a direct bearing on their per- 
